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The Suspect and Society. WALTER V. SCHAEFER. Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1967. Pp. vii, 99. $3.50.
In this small, cogent volume, Mr. Justice Walter V. Schaefer of the
Illinois Supreme Court-like Mr. Chief Justice Traynor' of the California Supreme Court and Judge Henry Friendly2 of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit-expresses concern about the
Supreme Court's oversimplified answer to one of the more complex
problems that bedevil it. In doing so, he is courting the damnation of
the Liberal Establishment. For he has violated, however gentle his language, the Eleventh Commandment-or is it the First-of the Liberal
Creed: "Thou Shalt Not Criticize the United States Supreme Court."
Whether Mr. Justice Schaefer is thereby, like Judge Learned Hand,3
to be forever precluded from admission to the Liberal Pantheon remains to be seen. The judgment will not be overtly made. But the
oracles are to be read grimly if the responses to his patent defection
from the faith take the form of epithets and labels rather than attempts
at reasoned answers to the charges made. One knows, for example, that
Professor Alexander Bickel 4 is not yet damned, because his efforts occasioned an attempt to meet his arguments. 5 One knows, on the other
hand, that there is little hope for Professor Herbert Wechsler's salvation, 6 since the typical reaction to his position was that there is no such
1 See Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention and Trial,
33 U. CHI. L. REv. 657 (1966).
2 See FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS (1967), especially chapter 11: "The Bill of Rights as a

Code of Criminal Procedure," and chapter 12: "A Postscript on Miranda." The latter
begins delightfully with some of Miranda's words in The Tempest:
"0, wonder!

How many goodly creatures are there here!
How beauteous mankind isl 0 brave new world,
That has such people in 'tI"
3 See HAND, THE BILL OF RIHTS (1958). These were the Oliver Wendell Holmes lectures

at Harvard for 1958. The 1963 edition contains an apologia by Judge Wyzanski as an introduction.
4 See Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword:The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV.
L. REv. 40 (1961).

5 See Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues": A Comment on Principle and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 CoLu'u. L. REv. 1 (1964). I am not sure, however, that
Profesor Gunther has the necessary status in the Liberal hierarchy to grant dispensation.
6 See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1959).

704

Book Reviews

thing as "neutrality. ' ' The latter is a tragic case, for it is clear that
Wechsler had set out to slay the dragons loosed by Judge Learned
Hand in his Bill of Rights, only to be impaled on the shafts of other
enemies of Hand's position.
The first fundamental sin committed by Mr. Justice Schaefer is to
be found in the suggestion that the problem of the proper scope and
methods of police interrogation of suspects involves a balancing of
interests. Indeed, it is because he would make the catechism into a
dialogue that he falls into the errors of his ways. He begins thus on
his road to perdition:
The disruption of existing practices by the expansion of constitutional ideals creates the tension that pervades this area
of the law. And when our ideals and our institutions confront
one another, it is important that both be analyzed objectively.8
He goes so far as to suggest that in this area the legislative process
may have advantages that the judicial process lacks. And, although he
genuflects properly to his masters on the Supreme Court, he also points
out that expedience of judicial administration may have taken precedence over refinement of proper rules:
I ask you to keep in mind the situation that confronts the
Supreme Court of the United States. That Court bears the
ultimate responsibility for the quality of justice that is administered in this country ....

Any technique by which its

responsibility to guard against improper police conduct can
be effectively delegated, with the assurance that the exercise
of the delegated authority can be readily supervised, is bound
to be attractive to the Court. 9
There is no doubt in his mind as to the Court's ultimate destination:
A number of constitutional doctrines have been brought to
bear on the interrogation problem, and legal doctrines, like
other ideas, have a tendency to push on to their logical conclusion ....

Today, I believe, the doctrines converging upon

the institution of police interrogation are threatening to push
on to their logical conclusion-to the point where no questioning of suspects will be permitted. 10
7
Cm.

See Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U.
L. REv. 661 (1960).

8

P. 7.

9

Pp. 9-10.
Pp. 8-9.
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In excellent summary he encapsulates the Court's history that has
intertwined a number of different constitutional provisions to bring
about the result that he fears. It starts with the ban under the due
process clauses of the use of involuntary confessions, first because of
their untrustworthy nature and then as a means of preventing illegal
police practices. It proceeds with the strand provided by the fifth
amendment's privilege against self-crimination, to which is added
the newly created sixth amendment right to counsel and the fourth
amendment's new limitations on the right of arrest. His willful failure
to see the light is apparent here too:
I see nothing in the language of the Fourth Amendment,
which prohibits unreasonable seizures of the person, that requires it to operate as a blunt instrument. It seems to me more
relevant to ask whether there is probable cause for restraining a suspect than to ask whether there is probable cause for
believing in the suspect's guilt. The Fourth Amendment does
not, I submit, preclude us from weighing the extent of the
detention against the strength of the evidence that justifies
it.'1
All the while, he persists in the heresy that the government and its
police and prosecutorial agents have a proper function to perform-the
arrest and conviction of those guilty of criminal activity:
Police interrogation seems to me a useful and desirable technique of law enforcement; yet interrogation seems threatened
by constitutional developments which, in the main, are the
product of logical efforts to make the Constitution effective
in the police station. 12
It is primarily this secret quality of station-house interrogation that has caused the problem. There have been abuses
and there will continue to be abuses, so long as it is impossible to know exactly what occurred during the course of interrogation. Enough has been disclosed in reported decisions
to establish incontrovertibly the necessity for supervision. But
because some confessions and admissions are the result of improper, even abhorrent, police conduct during station-house
interrogation does not mean that the appropriate remedy is
to outlaw all interrogation and all confessions and admissions
made during a period of police custody. The appropriate cure
for the undue influence that is sometimes brought to bear on
11 Pp. 25-26.
12 P. 36.
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between a
a testator is not to prohibit all communication
13
testator and his potential legatees.
He even praises the efforts of the framers of the American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure in their efforts to
solve what he sees as the fundamental problem:
I think that the Code proposes a rational adjustment between
and the
considerations of individual liberty on the one hand,
14
law enforcement needs of society on the other.
After examining the A.L.I.'s proposals, however, he concludes that
they are defective because they would provide only a police official
rather than a judicial officer to oversee the interrogation that the proposed Code would authorize. It is fairly clear that the decision of the
Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona' 5 has, since the delivery of the
lectures that make up this book, effectively diminished the possibility
of effectuating the A.L.I. proposals.
In any event, Mr. Justice Schaefer would resort to a different resolution of the problem and, in so doing, commits his second fundamental violation of the Liberal Creed. For he proposes a solution that
would be brought about by constitutional amendment, thus putting
himself in the category of those who have sponsored similar devices
to repeal the effect of the Supreme Court's one-man one-vote decisions
and the decisions banning prayer in the public schools. And the proposition he puts forth is one that questions the very foundations of the
dogma, for it suggests that the privilege against self-crimination should
be rested on a rational rather than an allegedly historical base:
As we examine the justifications advanced to support the
privilege, you will note that even at this late period in our
history it remains a doctrine in search of a reason. As Professor Kalven has said, it "is the product of a tangled and
complex history of abuses many of which have been corrected
today by other legal safeguards ....

[T]he law and the law-

yers despite endless litigation over the privilege have never
made up their minds just what it is supposed to do or just
whom it is intended to protect." As we shall see, the Supreme
Court has experienced this difficulty. 16
13 Pp. 37-38. Mr. Justice Schaefer disposes of the argument that other common-law countries have functioned effectively in their police work in the absence of police interrogation.
See pp. 31-35.
14 P. 38.

15 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
16 P. 61.
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His solution is one with a venerable, if unsuccessful, career. And he
notes the irony that put the police in the vanguard of those who challenged the propriety of such legislation when it was first proposed in
the thirties by, among others, the Wickersham Commission:
The proposal of interrogation before a judicial officer is thus
central to the drive for broader discovery in criminal proceedings. The idea is by no means novel. The national concern in the 1920's and 1930's over third-degree practices stimulated a number of such proposals, principally those of Dean
Pound and Professor Kauper, and legislation was urged in
several states. Perhaps because constitutional doctrines did not
then, as now, threaten the extinction of police questioning,
the proposals met with public indifference or hostility. The
police were especially hostile, although perhaps to take as
typical these words of the Los Angeles Chief of Police about
a California proposal would be unfair: "That bill was backed
by the Communist Party of America, by the Constitutional
Rights Committee of the Los Angeles Bar Association, the sob
sisters, the prison reformers and all that type of individual,
who wanted to see the law defeated, who wanted 7to set at
naught the work of the peace officers of the state.'
There is certainly a lesson to be learned from the refusal of the
group that was having things all its own way-the police at that timeto recognize that it was in its own best interests to negotiate a reasoned
settlement that would both protect the individual and afford the police
all the inquisitorial rights that they should properly exercise. The shoe
is now on the other foot, and the question is whether the defenseminded organizations will perceive the desirability of doing something
before it begins to pinch. For, I suspect, if such a solution as this book
proposes proves unacceptable, the Liberals are likely to have imposed
on them one that is the creature not of Mr. Justice Schaefer, but rather
of someone more concerned with the protection of police interests, or
17 P. 77. The Wickersham Commission recommendation was: "[E]very person arrested
charged with crime should be forthwith taken before a magistrate, advised of the charge
against him, given the right to have counsel and then interrogated by the magistrate. His
answers should be recorded and should be admissible in evidence against him in all subsequent proceedings. If he chooses not to answer, it should be permissible for counsel for
the prosecution and for the defense, as well as the trial judge, to comment on his refusal.
The existing rule in many jurisdictions which forbids counsel or court to comment on the
failure of the accused to testify in his own behalf should be abolished." NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW

OBSERVANCE AND

LAW ENFORCEMENT,

REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS

IN LAW

ENFORCEMENT 5-6 (1931). Mr. Justice Schaefer suggests that: "To avoid overenthusiastic
comment by a prosecutor, it might be wise to provide that only the judge may comment."
P. 80.
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what the police think their interests may be, and with little concern
for the rights of individuals.
The defects of the Supreme Court doctrine are made patent here
and in the Writings of Mr. Chief Justice Traynor and Judge Friendly
to which reference has already been made.' 8 The merits of the Schaefer
proposal are well set out in this small volume, for all those whose minds
are not closed to examine and weigh. I am among those who like Mr.
Justice Schaefer's answer. Perhaps, however, I should choose another
path than the constitutional amendment, at least to begin with. Congress, too, was given authority to interpret and implement the substantive clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The Court has recognized
this power and, indeed, in one instance has accepted Congressional interpretation with an alacrity and submissiveness that was almost unbecoming. 19 I should advocate, therefore, that the Schaefer proposal
be embodied in legislation enacted by Congress pursuant to its fourteenth amendment powers. If and when the Supreme Court is confronted with such legislation, we shall, perhaps, have answers to questions even more fundamental than those so admirably treated in this
book.
PHILIP B.

KURLAND*

18 See notes 1 &2, supra.
19 See Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 79.
* Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.

Aid to Dependent Children. WINIFRED BELL. New York and London:
Columbia University Press, 1965. Pp. xvi, 248. $6.50.
Of all the federally-aided public assistance programs, Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC), formerly called Aid to Dependent
Children, is the most notorious and least understood, the most costly
yet the least adequate in grants. Some observers who witnessed the
passage of its predecessors, state Mother's Pension laws, forecast controversy and ill effects from a program that provided cash payment,
rather than the then-customary provision of aid-in-kind or in institutions-poor farms, orphanages, and the like. One critic, the well-known
social worker, Mary Richmond, regarded Mother's Pensions as a backward step; they were providing "public funds not to widows only,
mark you, but to private families, funds to the families of those who
have deserted and are going to desert."' Yet another raised the basic
1
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